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D-l-101
To: The Federal Government Executive Committee 
The SEC Committee
Here is a copy of a bill, "the Financial Fraud Detection and 
Disclosure Act of 1986,” introduced today by Congressman Wyden 
and cosponsored by Congressman Dingell, among others. Its 
stated objective is:
To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require 
audits performed under the Federal securities laws 
to include reasonable procedures for financial fraud 
detection, and to require that audits report fraudulent 
activities to appropriate enforcement and regulatory 
authorities.
With sincere regards,





U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Washington, DC 20515
May 22, 1986
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Member of Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
1406 Longworth House Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Ron:
I am pleased to join you in sponsoring the Financial Fraud 
Detections nd Disclosure Act of 1986. This legislation is 
important, timely, and fully supported by the record developed 
during the course of hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations.
I have previously said that the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce would take appropriate legislative action on accounting 
matters when the record showed that it was necessary. That time 
has now arrived in the area of financial fraud, and I shall make 
every good effort to see that this bill is enacted into law 
during this Congress. .   
John D. Dingell 





THE FINANCIAL FRAUD DETECTION & DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1986
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1986
MR. WYDEN. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a bill designed to both require and 
enable independent auditors to detect and disclose illegal and fraudulent activities at 
publicly held corporations. This would be done pursuant to an auditor’s review of 
corporate documents and certification of financial statements required by federal 
securities laws.
The Financial Fraud Detection & Disclosure Act is a product of 16 months of hearings in 
the Energy & Commerce Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee. Six of my colleagues 
on the Subcommittee — Mr. Sikorski, Mr. Luken, Mr. Eckart, Mr. Slattery and Mr. Shelby, 
as well as the distinguished Chairman of both the Subcommittee and the full Committee, 
Mr. Dingell — have joined me as original cosponsors of this bill.
The regulatory system established under the federal securities laws is based on the 
concept of full and fair disclosure of all pertinent information to investors and other users 
of corporate financial reports. This legislation is designed to provide assurances to 
Congress and the public that illegal and irregular activities at publicly held corporations 
will be discovered and reported to the proper regulatory authorities by those in the best 
position to perform this vital function — independent auditors.
All too often in recent years, independent auditors either have failed to detect or to 
report fraudulent activities at a number of major corporations and financial institutions in 
this country. In one financial disaster after another, including E.F. Hutton, United 
American Bank, Penn Square Bank, E.S.M. Government Securities, Home State Savings 
and Loan of Ohio, American Savings and Loan of Florida, Drysdale Government Securities, 
Saxon Industries and others, the disaster struck virtually on the heels of a stipulation by 
audit firms that the companies were financially sound. The result? Hundreds of 
thousands of investors and creditors were out hundreds of millions of dollars.
The accounting profession — from the Cohen Commission to the Treadway Commission — 
has been studying this issue for 10 years, but has taken no effective action. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission also has failed to take the steps necessary to correct 
this deficiency — even though both it and the accounting profession have the authority to 
do so.
It is clear to us that the regulatory system is deficient in this critical area. Because the 
regulators and the profession have abdicated their responsibility, we feel it is time for 
Congress to step in.
In the 1984 case of United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the U.S. Supreme Court — in a 
unanimous decision — eloquently described the ’’public watchdog” role of independent 
auditors and the accounting profession. In that case, the Court declared that:
”By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial 
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's 
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This 'public watchdog' 
function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client 





I fully agree with the Court's assessment. Unfortunately, because audit firms must 
compete fiercely for lucrative corporate accounts, this emphasis on independence and 
fidelity to the public trust can sometimes get lost in the shuffle — and independent 
auditors often seem to feel that their primary loyalty is to the corporate managers who 
hire them.
This is particularly troubling where detection and disclosure of illegal or irregular 
activities at the audited firm is concerned. Because the standards used by independent 
auditors are fundamentally deficient in the area of detecting and disclosing illegal 
activities and financial irregularities, the accuracy of financial reports filed with the SEC 
for the protection of shareholders, depositors, creditors and the public at large can be 
seriously distorted.
Under the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards of the American Association of 
Certified Public Accountants, an independent auditor discovering fraud is only required to 
inform the client firm’s management and consider resigning from the audit account. 
Although a unanimous Senate Subcommittee report stated ten years ago that auditors 
should report illegal acts to government authorities, the AICPA has done little but study 
the issue ever since.
The wholly inadequate fraud reporting standards that were on the AICPA books ten years 
ago are still there — and make a mockery of the Supreme Court’s clear and eloquent 
statement on the independent auditor’s public responsibility. As Chairman Dingell has 
repeatedly pointed out during the course of the Subcommittee’s investigation, existing 
audit standards in this area are tantamount to telling the canine variety of a watchdog 
that his only duty, upon discovering a burglar in his house, is to leave the house.
Our Subcommittee has examined a number of massive, well-publicized financial disasters 
where independent auditors have failed to detect or report blatantly fraudulent activity. 
For example, an intricate and blatantly illegal shell game at ESM Government Securities 
that ultimately brought down the entire state-insured savings and loan industry in Ohio 
was unraveled in a matter of hours by the receiver appointed by the court to sort through 
the rubble.
In other instances, such as the Beverly Hills Savings & Loan Association in California, 
internal corporate controls designed to make it possible for independent auditors to detect 
irregularities were virtually non-existent. A separate section of our bill would upgrade 
the presently inadequate audit standards in this area by requiring independent auditors to 
thoroughly evaluate internal control mechanisms established by corporate management.
Mr. Speaker, all available evidence points to the conclusion that the impact and cost -- 
financially as well as in terms of public confidence — of financial fraud at publicly held 
corporations is increasing dramatically. A better early warning system to protect the 
public is clearly needed — and independent auditors are in the best position to provide 
that safeguard.
It is our hope that the accounting profession will quickly embrace this proposal. Our bill 
does not apply to small independent businesses or any auditing activities not required by 
federal securities laws. And it provides full legal immunity for auditors who report known 
or suspected illegal or irregular acts to the SEC or other appropriate authorities — a 





All audit firms certifying documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
will be affected alike by this legislation — in terms of both their duties and the 
protections provided for fulfilling these duties. This should enable auditors to protect the 
public and fully comply with their public watchdog responsibilities free from any fear that 
blowing the whistle will cause them to lose business to a competing firm.
The clear and specific standards we have drafted for detecting and reporting financial 
fraud will go a long way toward meeting the legitimate concerns of both the Congress and 
the public in this area. This legislation will be fully aired at upcoming Subcommittee 
hearings and Chairman Dingell has pledged to see to it that a bill is quickly reported out 
by the full Committee. We urge all our colleagues in the House to support this important 
initiative.
FINANCIAL FRAUD DETECTION AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1986
BACKGROUND
The regulatory system established by the Federal securities laws 
is based upon the concept of complete and fair disclosure of important 
information to investors and other users of corporate financial 
reports. This regulatory system is administered by Federal agencies, 
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) , working in 
concert with private, independent audit firms which check corporate 
financial records and certify the reports given to the public.
Over the past several years, numerous cases of massive financial 
fraud have occurred where the independent auditors either failed to 
detect or to report the fraudulent activities at the companies being 
audited. These include E.F. Hutton, United American Bank, General 
Dynamics, E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc., Home State Savings and 
Loan of Ohio, American Savings and Loan of Florida, Saxon Industries, 
San Marino Savings and Loan of California, and many others. The costs 
of these frauds have been enormous, both financially and in terms of 
public confidence in the soundness of the Nation’s economic system.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a 
private trade organization, establishes the generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS) which are used by independent auditors and 
accepted by the SEC. Under present GAAS rules, independent auditors 
do not include significant procedures to detect management fraud as 
part of their audit, and their consideration of fraud is restricted to 
its material impact on a corporation's financial statements. For a 
large corporation, financial fraud amounting to millions or even 
hundreds of millions could go unreported because such amounts would 
not be considered material to the total financial condition of the 
corporation.
Even when actual fraud and illegal acts are discovered, the GAAS 
rules only say that the auditor should inform the company's 
management, and consider resigning from the audit account. There is 
no requirement that auditors report fraud or illegal acts to the 
appropriate government authorities. In addition, auditors rely on the 
internal control systems of a corporation, but do not issue an opinion 
regarding the adequacy of management's internal controls. Thus, 
financial fraud has occurred in many corporations which have been 
allowed to operate with substandard or non-existent internal controls 
because the independent auditor did not report on the adequacy of 
internal controls.
The AICPA and the SEC were criticized on this issue ten years ago 
by the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management. 
That Subcommittee's final unanimous report stated that auditors should 
look for illegal acts and report them to government authorities. The 
AICPA appointed its own study group, the Cohen Commission, which 
failed to recommend active detection and reporting of illegal acts. 
The SEC and the AICPA did nothing further until the Subcommittee on
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Oversight and Investigations began its accounting hearings on February 
20, 1985.
At the March 6, 1985 hearing, Chairman Dingell was joined by 
other Members in expressing his concern about an audit rule which 
merely suggested that the auditor, as the public watchdog, only 
consider leaving the premises if he found a criminal, instead of 
reporting the criminal to the proper authorities. In response, the 
AICPA established a new group, the Treadway Commission, to further 
study the issue. The new group is not expected to report for another 
year and their inclination to meet the concerns of Congress is 
unknown. Neither private accounting organizations nor the SEC have 
the authority to grant independent auditors immunity from legal 
actions which could arise as a result of their fraud detection and 
disclosure responsibilities, so legislation is the only way to fully 
protect auditors performing their duties in good faith.
Chairman William Seidman of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, who formerly headed a large audit firm, agreed with 
Chairman Dingell and Congressman Wyden at the Subcommittee's April 28, 
1986 hearing that auditors should look for fraud and report it to 
regulators.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The "Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act of 1986" (the 
Act) amends the Federal securities laws to provide reasonable 
assurance that fraudulent activities at companies covered by these 
laws will be discovered and reported to the proper authorities. The 
Act will not apply to small businesses or other companies which are 
exempt from the securities laws. The Act is necessary now because the 
SEC and the accounting profession have steadfastly refused to accept 
responsibility for detecting and reporting financial fraud during the 
past ten years when the devastating impact of such frauds has 
increased dramatically. Furthermore, the SEC and the accounting 
profession lack the authority to provide full legal protection for 
auditors who report fraudulent activities.
The Act strengthens the present regulatory system of Federal 
agencies working with private audit firms by establishing clear 
standards for the detection and reporting of financial fraud, as well 
as the tools necessary to meet those standards and fully protect 
auditors performing their duties. The Act does not create a new 
Federal agency or regulatory burden, but instead assures that audits 
conducted under the present system will meet the legitimate concerns 
of Congress and the public that major companies are not operating 
fraudulently. The incremental audit costs of meeting the standards 
established by the Act are miniscule when compared with the lost 
billions of dollars resulting from frauds and the decline of public 
confidence in the integrity of the Nation's economic system.
The Act has seven basic provisions as described below:
(1) The Act requires that auditors include specific and substantive 
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procedures for detecting financial fraud as part of the audit 
plan. Present audit standards regard fraud detection as 
incidental to the financial audit. Therefore, many auditors 
either fail to recognize indications of fraudulent activities, or 
else convince themselves that such activities are not within the 
scope of the audit and that the auditor has no responsibility to 
act on such matters.
(2) The Act requires that auditors evaluate the internal control 
systems established by corporate managers in order for the 
auditor to determine whether those internal controls assure that 
corporate assets are being handled properly and lawfully. 
Present audit standards on reviewing internal controls are not 
strong enough in this regard.
(3) The Act requires auditors to issue a written report that:
(a) gives the auditor's opinion regarding the adequacy of 
internal control systems;
(b) identifies any weaknesses in those systems; and
(c) states that the audit was conducted in a manner which 
provides reasonable assurance that fraudulent 
activities have been detected and reported.
The auditor's written report is the place where the auditor gives 
opinions on the results of the audit. Present standards do not 
require that the auditor issue an opinion on fraud detection or 
the adequacy of internal controls.
(4) The Act requires that the individuals actually responsible for 
the audit sign the audit opinion on behalf of the firm conducting 
the audit. Present audit opinions only bear the name of the 
audit firm conducting the audit, even though the firms auditing 
most SEC registrants are giant organizations with hundreds of 
partners and thousands of staff. This provision in the Act is a 
no-cost, common sense way to enhance personal accountability to 
help assure that the audit was conducted properly. It also 
provides personal recognition for individuals doing good work, 
and enables the public and regulatory authorities to determine if 
auditors identified with problem audits are being made 
responsible for other audit engagements. The practice of 
individuals signing work product personally on behalf of their 
firm is commonplace in the legal profession and others.
(5) The Act requires public disclosure of known or suspected 
fraudulent activities, and gives the auditor a responsibility for 
assuring such disclosure. Present standards do not provide 
adequate disclosure of fraudulent activities, and auditors have 
no responsibility for assuring disclosure. Under existing rules, 
the corporate managers who are often involved in the fraud, are 
given sole responsibility for reporting to the public. The Act 
requires disclosure of activities that, in the auditor's view, 
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may be fraudulent so that users of financial reports and 
corporate managers will be able to take appropriate actions 
without the delay inherent in complete legal proceedings to reach 
conclusions which satisfy every requirement of law and evidence. 
In most cases, losses are magnified and irrevocable by the time 
legal proceedings are completed. This provision meets the 
requirement of the securities laws to give fair and complete 
disclosure of important information to the public in a timely 
manner so that the financial markets will operate efficiently.
(6) The Act requires that auditors report known or suspected illegal 
activities to the appropriate government regulatory or 
enforcement authorities. Present standards only require that 
auditors report such activities to corporate management (who may 
be involved) and then consider resigning the audit engagement if 
the corporate managers do not take appropriate action. Auditors 
are employed to be the public's watchdog, and the public is not 
served by the present standard which only suggests that the 
watchdog leave the premises if he finds a criminal. This 
provision also improves the efficiency of government regulatory 
and enforcement authorities by giving them the information which 
can only be found through the work of on-site auditors.
(7) Finally, the Act provides complete legal protection for auditors 
who perform their duties under the Act in good faith. Although 
the public expects auditors to report known or suspected 
fraudulent activities, auditors could suffer legal liability for 
honest reporting of their findings. This provision is consistent 
with the legal protection given to officials acting in good faith 
on the public's behalf in other areas. While the Act establishes 
clear standards to meet the public's expectations of auditors, it 




(Original signature of Member)
HLC
To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require audits 
performed under the Federal securities laws to include 
reasonable procedures for financial fraud detection, and to 
require that auditors report fraudulent activities to 
appropriate enforcement and regulatory authorities.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 22 1986
Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. DlNGELL, [and insert attached list of 
cosponsors]) introduced the following bill; which was 








1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United



































SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ''Financial Fraud Detection 
and Disclosure Act of 1986
SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by 
inserting after section 13 (15 U.S.C. 78m) the following new 
section:
"Audit Standards for the Detection and Disclosure of 
Financial Irregularities
"Sec. 13A.(a) Each audit or other financial examination 
conducted in the course of preparing or certifying any 
statement, balance sheet, report, application, valuation, or 
other document required by the securities laws or by any rule 
or regulation thereunder shall be conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of this section.
'(b) Each audit or other financial examination to which 
this section applies shall—
'(1) be conducted in accordance with specific and 
substantive procedures that reasonably ensure the 
detection and reporting of any illegal or irregular 
activity by any director, officer, employee, or agent of, 
or other person associated with, the entity begin audited 
or examined;
''(2) evaluate whether the internal accounting and 





























''(A) receipts and expenditures comply with 
applicable law;
''(B) funds and other assets are properly 
safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, 
and misappropriation; and
'(C) receipts and expenditures are recorded and 
accounted for properly;
and identify any weaknesses in such controls;
"(3) result in a written report by the auditor or 
examiner that—
''(A) certifies that the audit was conducted in 
accordance with the procedures required by paragraph 
(1);
''(B) contains a statement of the auditor's or 
examiner's evaluation of the internal accounting and 
administrative controls pursuant to paragraph (2), 
and an identification of any weakness in such 
controls;
'(C) identifies any activities that are detected 
during such audit that are or may be illegal or 
irregular; and
'(D) is signed personally by the auditor or 
examiner, and by the partner or manager (of the firm 




























responsible for the conduct of the audit or 
examination by such firm.
''(c) Each statement, balance sheet, report, application, 
valuation, or other document that is prepared or certified on 
the basis of an audit or examination to which this section 
applies shall include an identification of any activities 
that are detected during such audit that are or may be 
illegal or irregular.
'(d)(1) Each auditor or examiner who, in the course of 
conducting an audit to which this section applies, detects 
any activity that is or may be illegal shall report such 
activity—
"(A) to the Commission; and
''(B) to any other Federal, State, or local 
enforcement or regulatory authority that the auditor or 
examiner knows, or reasonably should know, has 
jurisdiction with respect to the activity.
''(2) The Commission shall report expeditiously—
''(A) to the attorney General any activity of which 
the Commission is informed under paragraph (1) that is or 
may be illegal under any Federal law; and
''(B) to other Federal, State, and local enforcement 
and regulatory authorities any activity of which the 
Commission is informed under paragraph (1) that is or may 





























''(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
relieve any auditor or examiner from the responsibility to 
detect and disclose any illegal or irregular activity, or any 
defect in any internal accounting and administrative control, 
because such activity or defect is not material to the 
statement, balance sheet, report, application, valuation, or 
other document that is being prepared or certified on the 
basis of an audit or examination to which this section 
applies.
''(f) No auditor or examiner who performs an audit to 
which this section applies shall be liable in any manner to 
any person for any finding, report, or statement required by 
this section, if such finding, report, or statement is made 
in good faith, based upon the auditor's or examiner's 
compliance with this section.
'(g) As used in this section—
''(1) the term 'securities laws' means the Securities 
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77 et seq.), this Act (15 U.S.C. 
78a et seq.), the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 (15 U.S.C. 79a et seq.), the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939 (15 U.S.C. 77aaa et seq.), the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-l et seq.), the Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-l), and the 



























''(2) the term 'illegal activity' includes any 
activity that violates any law or rule or regulation 
having the force of law;
"(3) the term irregular activity* means any 
activity that is not an illegal activity but that results 
in—
(A) an intentional distortion of any financial 
document or record; or
''(B) a receipt or expenditure in violation of 
the internal accounting and administrative controls 
of the entity, 
and includes any misrepresentation or omission of the 
effect of an event or transaction; any manipulation, 
falsification, or alteration of, or omission of 
significant information from, a document or record; 
recording of transactions without substance; intentional 
misapplication of accounting principles; or 
misappropriation of funds or other assets.
SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendment made by section 2 of this Act shall apply 
to any audit or examination that is commenced on or after 
January 1, 1987.
